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We construct a family of models to analyse the effect on optimal educational investment of 
(i) society’s preferences for equity and (ii) competition between countries. The models 
provide insights about the impact of a variety of parameters on optimal policy. In particular, 
we identify a form of ‘overeducation’ that is new to the literature, and provide a 
counterexample to a common finding in the literature on fiscal federalism. 
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Economists’ interest in education often focuses upon the rate of return to schooling 
investments. Yet it is a characteristic of the education system in many countries that, for the 
most part, schooling is funded out of the public purse. While one might imagine that 
governments should seek to ‘equalise rates of return in all directions’ (Blaug et al., 1969), it 
is often the case that the authorities have broader objectives that inform their educational 
investments. For example, a government may have preferences about equity as well as 
efficiency. Or it may, for various reasons, be concerned to ensure that its own investment in 
its people’s skills does not fall behind investments made by other countries. 
 
We examine these issues by developing, in the next section, a series of models that can aid 
our understanding of how, under a variety of conditions, the optimal provision of publicly 
funded education is determined. 
 
 
2. The Model 
 
In this section we present a family of related models of education and the tax system in order 
to provide insights into how governments can reach decisions about the optimal funding of 
education where (i) society has preferences about equity and (ii) decisions have impacts 





Suppose that the disposable income of individual i is given by  
 
Yi = (Y0 + sib)(1-τ)            ( 1 )  
 
where Y0 is basic income to be defined more precisely later, si is a binary variable that 
indicates whether the ith individual has undertaken schooling or not, τ is the proportional 
rate of income tax, and b is the income premium associated with schooling. Both Y0 and b 
are assumed exogenous. Tax revenues are used solely for the purpose of financing education 
which, we assume, takes place instantaneously.   
 
Denote by λ the proportion of the population n that undertakes education. Total tax revenue 
is given by  
 
τn(Y0 + λb )             ( 2 )  
 
Suppose that the cost of providing schooling to each individual is an increasing function of 
λ, and is, more precisely, given by γλ. The total cost of education is then γλ
2n, and this must 
equal the expression in (2) in order for the exchequer's books to balance. Solving for λ, 




2+4γτY0)]/2γ          ( 3 )  
 
The sum of disposable incomes is given by   
V   = n(1-τ)(Y0+bλ)  
 =  n(1-τ){Y0+b[τb+√(τ
2b
2+4γτY0)]/2γ}        ( 4 )  
 
To close the model, we introduce a social welfare function, maximisation of which yields 
solutions for the optimal tax rate and the optimal level of education. We begin with a 
particularly simple variant of the model in which social welfare equals 
 
W = n(1-τ)(Y0+λσb )            ( 5 )  
 
and where 0≤σ≤1 represents a weight attached to the premium earned by higher income 
(educated) individuals. In this way, society expresses its preferences concerning the income 
distribution.   
 




2+4γτY0)]/2γ}         ( 6 )  
 
It is possible, though tedious, to derive an analytical solution for the problem of maximising 
(6) with respect to τ. We denote this solution by τ*, and note that routine substitution of this 
into (3) yields the optimal level of education, λ*. Clearly  
 




λ* = λ*(b,Y0,γ,σ)            ( 8 )  
 
Since the analytical solutions for τ* and λ* are cumbersome and uninstructive, we proceed 
by way of numerical examples. In Table 1, we show the values of τ* and λ* that obtain for a 
variety of assumed values of σ. These are shown for various values of b, Y0 and γ. In the 
upper panel, we have b=0.5, Y0=1 and γ=2, while in the lower panel we have b=0.2, Y0=1 
and γ=3. The lower panel therefore represents a state in which returns to education are lower, 
and costs of education are higher, than in the upper panel.  
 
It is readily observed that investment in education, and consequently also tax rates, are lower 
in the lower panel than in the upper panel. This follows directly from the fact that returns to 
education are lower in the lower panel – with both the earnings premium to educated 
workers being lower and the cost of education being higher. It is also clear that investment in 
education, and tax rates, fall as society places more weight on equity. Raising educational 




2.2 International issues 
 
The second variant of the model that we examine is chosen to provide insights into 
international issues. In order to build in some interaction between the two countries, we 
assume b a decreasing function of global education levels. This is to reflect the labour market impact on one country of the educational investments made by another country, 
through changes, for example, in comparative advantage. Hence assume that 
 
b = δ/(β+λ1+θλ2)            ( 9 )  
 
 
where λ1 and λ2 respectively denote the proportion of the population in each country that 
undertakes education, and where β is a constant. For simplicity we assume that n, Y0 and γ 
are identical across countries. 
 
Noting that the balanced budget constraint 
 
τjn(Y0 + λjb) = γλj




τjn[Y0 + δλj/(β+λ1+ θλ2)] = γλj
2n,       j=1,2                 (11) 
 




2-τj(δ+Y0)λj-τjY0(β+θλk) = 0   j=1,2, k=1,2, j≠k                (12) 
 
to establish the levels of λ1 and λ2 as  
 
λj* = λj(τ1, τ2, γ, θ, β, δ, Y0)         j=1,2                 (13) 
 
The equations (13) are analogous to (3) in the earlier model.  
 
Define social welfare within each country, in analogous fashion to equation (5), as 
 
Wj = n(1-τj)[Y0+σδλj*/(β+λj*+θλk*)]    j=1,2                 (14)
         
To keep matters simple, suppose σ=1. The maximisation of Wj with respect to τj can proceed 
either with the two countries competing with one another, following Nash (1951), or with 
them playing cooperatively. In neither case is there a straightforward analytical solution, so 
we proceed by way of example. Results are shown for a variety of parameter assumptions in 
Table 2. By symmetry, each country has the same optimal tax rate and education level as the 
other in both the Nash and the cooperative case.  
 
The results indicate that the Nash solution implies higher tax and education levels than the 
cooperative solution. The intuition behind this result is straightforward. Starting from a 
cooperative position, each country, taking the other’s behaviour as given, has an incentive to 
raise its own investment in education. Consequently, Nash behaviour leads to a type of 
‘overeducation’ that is new to the literature. In contrast with the overeducation identified by 
authors such as Daly et al. (2000) and Dolton and Vignoles (2000), where some graduates 
fail to find work commensurate with their qualifications, the overinvestment in education 
that we observe in the present model represents a shortfall in welfare due to competition 
between countries.  
 The results reported here provide a striking contrast to a finding that is common in the fiscal 
federalism literature – namely that competition between tax jurisdictions leads to lower tax 
rates (Edwards and Keen, 1996). When, as in this model, the tax is spent on activity that is 
welfare enhancing, competition can have the opposite effect.  
 
 
2.3 Equity in the international model 
 
Extension of the model of the previous section to include values of σ<1 is straightforward, 
requiring no change to equations (9) through (14), and only a minor change in the 
programming. Results for a variety of parameter assumptions appear in Table 3. These 
results follow the patterns identified in the earlier sections of the paper and hence do not 
require extensive discussion here. As the returns to education, here measured by δ, increase, 
so does the optimal level of educational investment in either the Nash or the cooperative 
model, other things being equal. Likewise as σ rises, indicating weaker preferences for 
equity, so the optimal level of educational investment increases. It is worth noting, 






The notion that competition between countries leads to the setting of tax rates that differ 
from those that would obtain in the absence of such competition is a familiar one. In this 
paper, we have extended this to examine international competition in tax and government 
expenditure, where the expenditure takes the form of educational investments that in 
themselves yield gains in the form of enhanced income. We have also examined the 
operation of the model in the context of alternative societal preferences for equity. 
 
The type of overeducation identified in this paper is new to the literature, and it is not at all 
clear how extensive this effect might be in practice. An interesting avenue for future research 
might therefore be to evaluate this effect. It is suggested that multi-country computable 
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 Table 1 Optimal rates of tax and education under various parameter assumptions in the 
model of income distribution 
 
  σ=0.5  σ=0.75  σ=0.9  σ=1 
  τ*  λ*  τ*  λ*  τ*  λ*  τ*  λ* 
b=0.5 
γ=2 
0.09 0.2237 0.14 0.2827 0.16 0.3035 0.17 0.3136 
b=0.2 
γ=3 
0.03 0.1010 0.05 0.1308 0.07 0.1551 0.08 0.1660 




Table 2 Optimal rates of tax and education under various parameter assumptions in the 
international model 
 
 Model τ*  λ*  W* 
























Notes: Throughout it is assumed that γ=1, β=2.5, θ=0.5 and Y0=1. The value of welfare is 




Table 3 Optimal rates of tax and education under various parameter assumptions in the 
international model with income distribution considerations 
 
 Model  τ*  λ*  W* 
   σ=0.75  σ=0.9  σ=0.75  σ=0.9  σ=0.75  σ=0.9 










































Note: See notes to Table 2. 